

REGULATION OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY BY THE STATES OF THE NORTHERN BLACK SEA COAST (V–I CENTURIES B. C.)

Purpose: This work is devoted to the analysis of regulation methods of trade in the ancient states of Northern Black Sea Region in Classical, Hellenistic and Roman periods such as the free-trade privilege's (athelia), trade monopoly, financial regulation etc.

Methods: The theoretical and methodological aspects of the historical process of integration the Hellenic states of Northern Black Sea Region into trade and customs relations of the Pontic basin and the Aegean region, as well as into the imperial customs system of Rome have been identified in this research.

Results: This article is the new research in the historiography where the results of a long study of the ancient foreign economic activity and customs relations of the Northern Black Sea coast in the historical science are summarized concerning the different narrative, epigraphic, numismatic and historiographical sources. The author's conception of the role of customs regulation and other ways of regulation of foreign economic relations in antiquity is suggested. The special emphasis is put on the genesis of historiographic concepts being formed around the issues of taxation and customs relations in connection with the problems of the international trade of Tyra, Olbia, Chersonesus, Bosphorus, Egypt, cities-states of islands of the Aegean region in the Classic and Hellenistic periods and the Roman age. The possibilities of constructing the satisfactory model of international trade's and customs relations' history in the East Mediterranean region in the Ancient time are examined in this article.

Conclusions: This article defines the role of international trade agreements to ensure the grain trade of Bosphorus with Athens and Mytilene (Lesbos) and Bosphorus-Egypt likely trade competition. The possibilities of constructing the satisfactory model of international trade's and customs relations' history in the Aegean region and all East Mediterranean region in the Classic, Hellenistic periods and the Roman age are examined in this article.

Key words: Ancient Economic History, Ancient Economy, Hellenic States of the Northern Part of the Black Sea Region – Tyra, Olbia, Chersonesus, Bosphorus, Methods of Regulation of International Trade, Trade Policy, Customs Policy, Customs Regulations, Customs and Tax Relations, Athelia (Tax-Free), Psephismata, Proxenia, Non-Trade Forms of Exchange.

JEL Classification: A10, B11, F10, H30, O19, O23, N70.

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Introduction. The problem of studying various methods of regulating economic life, in particular, foreign economic activity, will never lose its *relevance*. The *novelty* in this regard marks all the studies in the field of ancient economic history. The issues of state regulation of trade in the ancient colonies of the Northern Black Sea region are a component of a much broader problem, covering the role of trade in the economy and in general in the life of ancient Greece. In the history of mankind, many models of interaction between the state (or institutions of public authority similar to the state) and the national economy have been worked out. These models formed a wide range from the complete absorption of the economic life of society by the royal temple (“state”) complexes of the 3rd dynasty of Ur in Sumer to the complete non-interference of political institutions in natural food production under European feudalism of the Middle Ages. It should not be thought that all these extremes are a thing of the past. The flourishing of the Stalinist “gulag economy” in the totalitarian USSR was remarkably reminiscent of the forced distribution economy of the Sumerian 3rd dynasty of Ur. The economic life of the Hellenistic world combined the private initiative of individuals (manufacturers, merchants,

financiers), their communities and associations with active attempts by public institutions (Hellenistic monarchies and city-states) to introduce regulatory foreign economic mechanisms. *The purpose of this article* is to study the problem of application (non-application) by the ancient states of the Northern Black Sea Region of regulatory methods of influencing on foreign economic activity. *The tasks* of the work include the study of financial regulation of foreign trade; consideration of attempts to establish monopolies for the import/export and production of “strategic” goods of the Hellenic economy – bread, oil, wine; studying methods of customs (tariff and non-tariff) regulation, in particular, granting the privilege of duty-free (athelia); tracking non-economic, non-trade, means of solving the most acute problems of food shortages for ancient states. *The methodology* used in the study is based on a hierarchy of methodological principles, general and special scientific methods and techniques. Among the principles the leading place is occupied by the principles of objectivity, consistency and historicism. An interdisciplinary approach is actively used, certain provisions of the methodological paradigm of social history and the provisions of the historical-anthropological approach are used. The following methods were important in the work: historical and logical, comparative (synchronous and diachronic), induction and deduction, retrospective and chronological methods of classification, reconstruction and modeling. During research with different groups of epigraphic sources, for example, with official acts of public authorities, the method of formulary-diplomatic analysis of the multi-temporal complexes of these northern Black Sea sources gained enormous weight in comparison with the formulary features of the protocols of lapidary sources from other parts of the Hellenic world. According to many experts, the Hellenistic and Roman eras of the economic history of the Ancient World are very similar to postclassical capitalism of the late 19th–20th centuries. *The logic of presenting the studied material* proceeds from the fact that the analysis of the attempts of the Hellenic states of the Northern Black Sea region of the 4th–1st centuries BC. It is extremely important to regulate certain aspects of foreign trade and customs affairs. Over the past century, an extensive historiography has formed around this problem, represented by supporters of mainly two directions: opponents and supporters of the idea of the existence of free trade as a key factor in the economic survival of ancient polisys and Hellenistic monarchies.

Literature Review. Researcher of the second half of the twentieth century. M. Finley noted that since the main economic unit of the ancient Greek society was a closed oikos (“farm”), and the policy is the sum of oikos and, thanks to this, an autarkic organism, trade was undeveloped, and the dominant role belonged to non-trade forms of exchange (Finley, 1973; Shterman, 1977, p. 165). However, such a position, first formulated in the late XIX – early XX centuries, at the same time became the object of severe criticism of the supporters of the concept of the wide development of trade relations and financial transactions in Ancient Greece. The dispute of “primitivists” – supporters of the concepts of a closed oikos economy (J. Karl Rodbertus, K. Bücher) and “modernists” – adherents of the theories of ancient “capitalism” (E. Meyer, K. J. Beloch), which lasted from the end of the XIX century. (Beloch, 1897; Markov, 1987, pp. 7–8; Brashynskyi, 1958), attracted the attention of specialists more than once during the 1920s–1960s. For example, in landmark works on the history of the ancient economy in 1928 and 1931.

J. Hasebroek would have smashed the “modernist” positions of E. Meyer and K. J. Beloch (Beloch, 1912–1927) if he himself had not resorted to exaggerations (Hasebroek, 1966). In a study by W. Zimmermann on piracy and maritime trade in Ancient Greece, it was noted that J. Hasebroek’s mistake was a misunderstanding of the “Greek character”: the ancient Greek was “an innate sailor and colonizer”. M. I. Rostovtsev wrote in 1932 that in the Hellenistic era, the economy differed from the modern one only quantitatively, and not qualitatively. Half a century after the works of W. Zimmermann and J. Hasebroek, John M. Findlay stated that qualitatively the study of the problem of the economic history of Ancient Greece had not advanced. At the II International Conference on Economic History in Aix-en-Provence (France, 1962), the futility of studying economics only from written sources and the need to attract archaeological sources was proved (Brashinsky, 1984, p. 11–13). Thanks to the latter, it was possible to discover many facts that contradict the point of view about the underdevelopment of commercial forms of exchange in ancient Greece in general and in the Northern Black Sea Region in particular, and now the importance of trade in those times is recognized. At the same time, a comparison of archaeological data with written evidence does not allow us to speak about the qualitative identity of modern and ancient economies.

Empirical results. Newly established apoikias of the Northern Black Sea Region in the VII–V centuries BC were constituted as polisys, the main task of which was the creation of an independent community

capable of self-sufficiency. An integral part of the economy of such autarchic polisys was trade, designed to provide the community with those goods that were vital (both from a physical and spiritual point of view) for its full functioning, and the production of which could not be established locally for various reasons. Therefore, trade occupied, by and large, a marginal place in the economy of the archaic societies of Greece, because they bought only what was objectively impossible to work out on the spot (Kuznetsov, 2000, p. 36).

Since the time of the Classics the situation has changed: in the ancient economy, trade occupies an increasingly significant place, which is facilitated by the gradual specialization of production. And although throughout its history, ancient civilization remained agrarian, during the era of economic prosperity and the rise of certain industries, mainly crafts and trades, they were market-oriented. In agriculture, the absolute advantage remained with natural forms of farming over commodity ones, which is typical for all traditional societies. Therefore, in the agricultural production of ancient states, as a rule, only one or two agricultural crops were intended for sale. For Attica, these were olives, or rather oil; for Chios, Thasos, Aegina – grapes, or rather wine; for the Bosphorus – wheat. In general, the economy remained multicultural, and everything necessary for the life of the owner and his family was produced mainly on the spot (History of Europe, 1988, p. 278–279). This was further promoted by the ideal of polis autarky. In the course of the specialization of production in ancient Hellas, the archaic ideal of autarchy for many polisys, especially the most economically developed ones, became unattainable. In this sense, it is significant how during the 5th century BC the content of this concept has changed: it no longer means complete economic isolation and self-sufficiency, but the ability to provide oneself with everything necessary through trade relations (or in another way) (History of Europe, 1988, p. 282–283). During the Classics, free trade took one of the leading places in the system of providing polisys, however, of course, this concerned prestige goods (fine wines, fish sauces, jewelry, precious weapons) and popular goods (ceramics, lanterns, architectural decorations), as well as those that could not be worked out on the spot and vital (marble, olive oil, wine, bread). However, in ensuring the normal functioning of the policy in all areas from the sacred to everyday life, city magistracies from the very beginning took upon themselves the issues of the uninterrupted supply of strategic goods. Now it is oil and gas, and in antiquity it is bread and butter. Along with trade, there are such forms of economic interaction in the international sphere as tribute, gifts, regular taxation, and outright robbery. In the Hellenistic era, with the emergence of large territorial states-monarchies, as evidenced by inscriptions and data from narrative sources, the last forms of provision sometimes come to the fore (Trofimova, 1961, p. 51). Along with this, direct or indirect state intervention in foreign trade and even in production is becoming almost systematic. Such interference was not something new and unprecedented, but it was precisely in the classical and even more so in the Hellenistic era that in some ways it acquires the features of conscious economic regulation. The leaders in this were the Egyptian Ptolemies and the Syrian Seleucids, but similar processes took place in other parts of the ecumene.

The ancient colonies of northern Pontus actively used various methods to regulate foreign economic activity, for example, **monetary and financial regulation**. If local, as a rule, copper coins were used for domestic trade, then foreign merchants were paid with silver, gold or electronic coins minted in different cities. Not later than IV century BC states prohibit the circulation of all foreign money on their territory. The convenience of trade turnover and fiscal affairs was facilitated by the general right to freely transport money across the customs border, the establishment of a single place for the implementation of trade and money transactions and the determination of a rigid exchange rate, the abolition of both trade duties for exchange transactions and import and export duties on chopped gold and silver. This practice was consolidated, in particular, by the Olbian law 340/330 BC. e., proposed by Kanoba and approved by the people's assembly of Olbia (IOSPE, I², 24). The monetary reform of Kanoba, as noted by P. O. Karyshkovsky, along with positive shifts in monetary circulation – the introduction of coins from two unequal metals, silver and copper, into circulation – created the conditions for the destruction of the main patterns of financial development, which led to an economic crisis. (Ancient History of Ukraine, 1998, p. 315).

The unsuccessful (or premature) financial measures in the field of trade policy include an attempt by Athens to unify monetary circulation within the framework of the Delos symmachia. According to the so-called Coin Decree (449–419 BC), allied cities were forbidden to mint their own silver coins and use non-Athenian coins, as well as weights and measures (Anthology of sources, 2000, p. 26). The Olbian law of Kanoba, the junior of the Athenian decree by almost a hundred years, in its main features imitated the financial practice of the first Athenian maritime union. Together with the transition of Olbia to the

Athenian monetary, weight and dimensional systems, this allowed some experts to insist that this northern Black Sea policy belonged to the Athenian Union.

We obtain important information about financial transactions at the state level from the corpus of Demosthenes' speeches. From the speech against Leptinus, one can conclude (Dem., XX, 40) that part of the trading operations for the purchase of Bosphorus bread was carried out by Athens on credit, because "you [Athenians] always have his [Levkon's] money" (Demosthenes, 1994, p. 24). It could only be the money received from the bread sold to the Athenians. Zhebelev offers an understanding of the words of Demosthenes in the sense that crediting operations for the purchase of Bosphoran grain was carried out through the Athenian "state bank", where the money received by the kings for the sold bread was kept as a deposit. Although, strictly speaking, the researcher clarifies, the Δημοσία τράπεζα mentioned in the text was not a state, but a private institution, but also conducting its business together with the Athenian financial department and was endowed with a monopoly to perform operations on behalf of the Athenian people. (Zhebelev, 1953, p. 132, note 2). There is confirmation of this in the Athenian decree of 346 BC (IG, II 2, 212 = MIS, No. 3), which says that the sons of Leukon Spartokos II, Perisad I and Apollonius should be returned the money due to them so that they "do not reproach the Athenian people" (Grakov, 1939, p. 239–241). It can be seen from the decree that the debtors of Levkon, and after the death of his children, were not private Athenian merchants, with whom, probably, trade on credit was not carried out, but the "Athenian people", that is, the state. The money had to be returned from the treasury; the prohedra were instructed to conduct business first after religious matters. It was extremely important for Athens to maintain trust and credit with the rulers of the Bosphorus, since they were not able to cover all the costs of purchasing Bosphoran bread with their exports (Brashinsky, 1958, p. 137).

Consequently, we are forced to recognize a significant, slowly but steadily growing role of financial resources among the methods of state regulation of trade. However, the poverty and fragmentation of the Northern Black Sea Region sources from this area does not allow either to reconstruct all financial measures, or at least approximately calculate the budgets of the ancient states of the region¹.

No less effective than the method of financial regulation was the **method** of direct state intervention in economic production through the establishment of a **monopoly** on the sale or sometimes on the production of a certain group of goods. As Aristotle noted in Politics (I, 4, 6), the Greek polis established monopolies when they experienced financial difficulties and the need to significantly increase revenues to the treasury (Aristotle, 2002). As a rule, monopolies concerned high-demand goods – bread, vegetable oil, wine. In addition, monopolies were introduced in those regions where the corresponding goods were produced in large quantities and constituted a significant export article.

For example, in Egypt, whose agriculture under Alexander the Great (332–323 BC) was under royal control, grain exports were controlled by the royal agent Cleomenes. In Hellenistic Pergamum, the highly profitable oil trade was monopolized. In Ptolemaic Egypt, the state controlled the wine trade and the olive oil trade. State monopolization also covered the grain trade: according to the royal order, 50–49 BC. e. The purchase of wheat and leguminous fruits in Middle Egypt by private individuals and the importation of these goods into the Delta or Thebaid was forbidden under any guise², however, the import to Alexandria was declared unimpeded (Chrestomathy, 1936, p. 226).

The state monopoly provided for certain measures of influence on the manufacturer and seller of goods by state structures and the bureaucracy in order to receive additional funds from the treasury and support the income of its own population. So, according to the Thasian decrees of the 5th–4th century BC the sale of wine only in vessels with the seals of astynoms was considered as legal, the import of foreign wine into the territory between Athos and Pachaia, which was oriented to the Faso wine market, was also prohibited, the sale of wine was also limited to a certain time of the year, and the sale of grapes in the vine was prohibited. According to the inscriptions from the city of Korresii on about. Keos, the duties of the astinoms included export supervision (Neichardt, 1963, p. 313). In Ancient Egypt, under the

¹ In the work of 1953 "Agriculture in the ancient states of the Northern Black Sea region" (Appendix No. 1 "On the budget of the Bosphoran state"), V.D. Blavatsky tries to calculate the state budget of the Bosphorus of the Spartocidae period (Blavatsky, 1953, p. 201–204). Unfortunately, this attempt cannot be considered satisfactory, since the researcher takes as the basis for calculating the annual profit from grain exports the export figure of 400,000 medimns, which is given by Demosthenes (XX, 31). However, the speaker gives data only on the annual export from Panticapaeum to Athens, without specifying the amount of export to other Bosphoran partners or from other Bosphoran ports. Therefore, the figure of annual income from the grain trade of 260–270 talents and the total income of the Spartocidae state of 300–350 talents per year is clearly underestimated. It should also be noted that the ancient states, unlike modern ones, in principle did not have clear and rigid budgets.

² As you can see, we are talking about the practice of internal customs borders.

conditions of the state monopoly on the production and sale of oil, fixed in the “Tax Charter” of Ptolemy Philadelphus, the local administration forced the royal lands and plots of cleruchs to be planted with olive crops (Vinokurov, 2003, p. 23).

In Chersonesus, astynomial stamps, which occasionally contained rough images of a stick or a bunch of grapes, and most often – the position and name of an astynom, for example, about 160 names of these magistrates are known (Borisova, 1955, pp. 143–148), guaranteed the correct volume and measure of products sold in amphoras: wine, salted fish, oil, bulk products. Undoubtedly, the astinoma stamp, the “trademark” of the state, is evidence of the regulation of trade by it, but for Chersonesus we have no other parallel evidence that allows us to assert the direct intervention of polis magistrates in trade itself – in pricing, determining the volume of purchase and sale or the range of goods.

The possibility of the existence of grain and wine monopolies, according to indirect data, is fixed in the Bosphorus. It is reliable that the settlers on the tsarist lands (χώρα βασιλική) were dictated which agricultural crops that were beneficial for the treasury should be grown to a greater extent (Vinokurov, 2003, p. 23). The author of the second book of the pseudo-Aristotelian “Economics” (320s BC) names specific examples of monopolies, among which there is no Bosphorus. Zhebelev, noting the significant participation of the Spartocidae in grain exports, rejects the opinion that it was monopolized by the ruling dynasty. This export was under the direct control of the tsars, but it was not monopolized, in the proper sense of the word: one can only speak of a monopoly tendency or partial monopoly (Zhebelev, 1953, p. 136).

Chersonesus civil oath dating from the 4th-3rd century BC, strictly prohibits the sale of “bread brought from the plain” to another place, except for Chersonesus (Oath of citizens of Chersonesus, 1902, p. 8). Even the first translator of this decree, V. Latyshev, offered two explanations for the establishment of a strict grain monopoly: either the lack of grain resources for the export, which was only enough to meet the needs of the policy itself, or the desire of the authorities to increase the income of the main city of the state by turning it into a single grain one. a market for its citizens (Oath of citizens of Chersonesus, 1902, p. 15). Such a prohibitive norm of the Chersonesus oath is very similar to the legislative provisions originating from the two leading regions of the Hellenic ecumene, distant not only geographically, but also chronologically. Firstly, this is the already mentioned order of the Egyptian monarchs of the middle of the 1st century BC. about the prohibition to export a number of agricultural goods from the Nomes above Memphis to the Delta and Thebaid, against the background of the simultaneous unimpeded permission to import such goods to Alexandria (Chrestomathy, 1936, p. 226). It can be assumed that the prohibitive and permissive norms of this decree are associated with the status of Alexandria as the most important trading center of Egypt, through which many export-import operations were carried out, which were subject to state taxes and duties. Secondly, these are the Athenian grain laws (operated in the 5th–4th and probably in the 3rd century BC), which should guarantee the regular provision of citizens with bread. It can be assumed that the law, the violation of which in Athens was punishable by death – to import bread only to the Athenian market (Dem., XXXIV, 37; XXXV, 50), was aimed not only at providing the given state with bread in the first place, but also designed to fulfill fiscal tasks. These latter – an increase in the income of the policy through customs taxation of the grain trade – were decided by the relevant city decrees.

In this regard, M.K. Trofimova put forward an interesting assumption. A fragment from an official letter from Antigonos³, which deals with taxes on exports, which were provided for as a result of the merger of the polis of Lebedos and Theos (Syll 3, 344, 94–101), genetically proceeds not only from the carefully thought-out fiscal system of the Hellenistic monarchs, but also from the Polis orders (Trofimova, 1961, p. 56).

It is possible to find out the potential ability of Chersonesus to introduce a grain monopoly and to determine whether there was a need for it, by comparing the available facts. To do this, as Aristotle believed, it is necessary to calculate the size of the grain resources of the city-state and establish when financial crises took place and how the citizens of Chersonesus reacted to them. The dimensions of the own grain resources of the Hellenistic Chersonesus, as well as the origin of the Chersonesus bread mentioned in the oath, have attracted the attention of historians for a long time. Some researchers, on the basis of predominantly speculative constructions, deny the richness of the grain potential of the Kherson chora, while others, on the contrary, exaggerate it (look Kadeev and Sorochan, 1989; Katsevalov,

³ Antigonos I Monophthalmus (around 380–301 BC), being the Macedonian governor of Phrygia, Lycia and Pamphylia, he made an attempt, together with his son Demetrius I Poliorcetes, to establish his own state in Asia Minor, taking the royal title in 306. Here we are talking about his letter on Sinoykism to Lebedos and Teos, in which this letter, unprecedented in variety of content, experts consider it an invaluable source (див. : Welles, 1934, p. 15 & next).

192?). However, no matter what they understand by the concept of the “plain” of the Chersonesus oath – the chorus, which consisted of the Herakleian Peninsula and, in its heyday, the coastal strip of Western Crimea, or the spacious expanses of the steppe Crimea, which belonged to settled Scythian farmers, the private export of bread remains indisputable abroad. The plain Scythian Crimea, located to the east of the Chersonesus state and to the west of the Bosphorus, as Strabo noted, produced a large amount of grain, in the purchase of which both the Bosphorus and Chersonesus acted as a kind of competitor. However, we do not know how the import of Scythian bread was organized both to Chersonesus and to the Bosphorus.

In the first centuries AD, Chersonesus exported mainly salt and fishing products, not bread: the limited grain base on the Herakleian Peninsula did not provide such opportunities. Even with a minimum consumption of 500 g per inhabitant of Chersonesus and its district, it turns out that a city with a population of 10–15 thousand people could export a maximum of 900-1800 tons of its own grain per year, which was not more than one or two dozen medium-tonnage ships. This was the extreme limit of export capacity, which assumed the full use of arable land and stable yields. In the first centuries, the price of bread averaged a denarius according to the mode of grain (6.5 kg). It turns out that the sale of such a quantity of bread could bring the city about 132–271 thousand copper denaria. However, if the population of the city and the district increased to 20 thousand, such reserves were no longer enough to meet the needs of the domestic market. This was one of the reasons Chersonesus establishes trade with the local population of the Southwestern Crimea from I century BC, developing it mainly in the northeast direction, along the third ridge of the Crimean Mountains. This area should at least partially cover and compensate for the loss of the grain-growing base in the North-Western Crimea. But, according to epigraphic sources, in I century BC – II century AD food complications were periodically felt, especially during conflicts with the Scythians and other tribes. Consequently, in conditions of dependence on grain supplies from the South-Western Crimea, Chersonesus grain exports could not be large. (Sorochan, Zubar, Marchenko, 2001, c. 123).

The Chersonesus oath does not prohibit either the free importation of grain through any points, or the private internal grain trade. The famous Chersonese oath contains, according to Francott, a ban on private individuals to conduct direct foreign (rather than internal) trade (Katsevalov, 192?, p. 21). According to S. A. Zhebelev (Zhebelev, 1953, pp. 232–233), following the logic of V. V. Latyshev (Oath of Citizens, 1902, pp. 8–15), Chersonesus could have at its disposal that its surplus for export. The demand contained in the oath of the citizens of Chersonesus was aimed not only at compiling a grain business, but at concentrating the export of grain in the hands of the state. The state not only strove to receive an appropriate duty from the exported grain, but also revealed clearly expressed monopolistic tendencies in the organization of the grain trade, apparently imitating the neighboring Bosporan Kingdom. Some analogy of the paragraph of the oath under consideration is contained in the Theos inscription of the end of the 4th century BC – the mentioned letter of Antigonos regarding the projected Sinoikism of Theos and Lebedos (Syll³, 344). In one of the clauses of the contract, which was never implemented, it was noted that all grain arriving in both cities must be brought to the common market, and the export of bread is carried out after a formal declaration and payment of duties (Zhebelev, 1953, p. 233, note 1).

The assumption (unfortunately, unsubstantiated) by Zhebelev about the hidden political and economic reason for the mentioned ban is of interest. Yes, it is known that the Chersonesus oath was developed and put into practice after the failure of an anti-democratic coup attempt. It is possible that individual representatives of the upper strata, who initiated the recent unsuccessful coup and sought to change the constitutional system of Chersonesus, dreamed of receiving the benefits that a democratic state had from the grain business and customs duties (Zhebelev, 1953, p. 233).

The categorical prohibition to bring grain from the plain to any place other than Chersonese also suggests that there are cases of smuggling of grain to Kerxinitis, Kalos limnn or another place on the western coast of the peninsula. In general, there are enough examples of smuggling in ancient history. For example, the excessive increase in duties by Carthage in the III century BC not only allowed to wage war with Rome, avoiding total taxation of the population, but also forced merchants, bypassing customs rules, to resort to smuggling. According to W. Zimmermann, this weakened the economy of Carthage so much that it became one of the reasons for its conquest by the Romans. Fall of Greece the same W. Zimmermann explained similar reasons. “Smuggling, which is so easy to do on the protruding bowls and peninsulas along the coast of Greece, organized and increased to such an extent that only customs guards, smugglers and robbers lived on the borders of Attica ... This state of Greece was ... one of the main

reasons for its fall” (Zimmermann, 1859, p. 8, Neichardt, 1963; Markov, 1987, p. 7). Smugglers were often severely punished. So, in the middle of the I century BC guilty of violating the already mentioned order of Ptolemy XIII and Cleopatra VII 50–49 BC, which established a state ban on the export of bread from Central Egypt (and a very non-poor person could afford to buy batches of bread), was subject to the death penalty. The criminal’s property was confiscated, and if the smuggler was arrested on a denunciation, the scammer received a third of the confiscated property, and the scammer-slave – one-sixth and freedom (Chrestomathy, 1936, p. 226).

The maintenance of the trade monopolies introduced by the ancient states, as can be seen from the examples given, by the way, also fell on the customs officers. Such a practice, in addition to enriching the treasury, could provoke internal conflicts, and, along with an unjustified increase in customs duties, lead to the emergence and growth of smuggling. The latter was both a manifestation of individual money-grubbing and a thirst for wealth, and the result of an imbalance in the personal or group interests of the merchants and the aspirations and interests of the state.

Finally, the most active methods of regulating foreign economic activity were the methods of simplifying the structure and reducing the number of customs payments. The main instruments of this method of regulating trading activity – granting the right to duty-free trade – belonged to the *Atelos* (ἀτέλεια)⁴. This right extended both to individuals and their associations, and to states. Among the first were their own citizens, who could be granted the right to duty-free during periods of special economic success of the policy, honored foreigners (also members of their families, heirs, partners, slaves), who were awarded citizenship and duty-free mainly for special merits, most often for supporting citizens in their homeland donor polis.

The concept of *Atelos* (ἀτέλεια) covered not only the right to trade without duties, but also freedom from various kinds of taxes. So, in the decree 330/320 BC about the *isopoliteia* “ἰσοπολιτεία” (equality of rights) of the citizens of Miletus and Olbia, it is written: “The Milesians use the *Atelos* on the same grounds as before” (Skrzhinskaya, 2000, p. 208). Translating this treaty, B. N. Grakov conveys the term ἀτέλεια in a broad sense not just as freedom from duties, but as “freedom from taxes”, “exemption from taxes” (Grakov, 1939, p. 264–265). Such legislative provisions represent precisely the privilege of the Milesians in Olbia and the Olbianites in Miletus, and not a mass exemption of all Olbians and all Milesians from taxes. The common view that the entire mass of natural citizens was covered by the privilege of duty-free, and this was a common universal practice, is not entirely fair. Only a powerful (or closed, economically undeveloped) state could refuse such a source of profit as duty. Therefore, it is unlikely that the citizens of the North Pontic cities throughout the history of their cities enjoyed duty-free. So, according to Diodorus Siculus (XX, 24), after the victory in the internecine fratricidal war of 309 BC Bosphorus king Eumel promised the people’s assembly to preserve the right to duty-free (SC, I, 477). For his ancestors, the citizens of Panticapaeum used this right in the capital and, possibly, in other Bosporan harbors, and also, probably, during trade travels by land (Anthology of sources, 2000, p. 501, note 3).

The very fact of such a promise spoke not only of the possibility of abolishing such a right by the monarch, but that it had recently been abolished⁵. No less expressive is the example of Athens, where 355 BC Leptin, in order to overcome financial difficulties, proposed to the Athenians to pass a law abolishing the freedom from duties for citizens (Dem., XX).

Consideration of ways to regulate foreign economic activity will not be complete without answering the question: could these methods, even with their conscious and complex application, radically change the economic situation in the Mediterranean or contribute to changes in the economic situation of a particular country, for example, as it happened in the XIX-XX centuries during the industrial revolution in connection with the introduction of a protectionist or free trade model of customs policy. Directly connected with this question is another, already: whether there was **competition in international markets between the leading Hellenic states**.

⁴ This problem is considered in more detail by the author in separate works (Kolesnikov, 2008, p. 3–9; Kolesnikov, 2010, p. 262–275).

⁵ In the literature, there is also an alternative point of view on the nature of the Eumelian *atelos*. According to a number of experts, Diodorus (XX, 24) speaks of the abolition of the tax from Panticapaeum citizens for the maintenance of a hired royal army, established instead of military service in the civil hoplite militia (see: SC, I, 477). The very fact of such a tax against the background of the removal of citizens from military affairs, which contradicted the polis ideology and morality, could be perceived as an insult (Rostovtsev, 1989, p. 189). In fairness, it should be noted that the Spartocidae, according to Polyaeus (VI, 9, 2), had well-founded reasons to doubt the loyalty of the hoplite citizens (Polyaeus, 2002, p. 214–215).

The existence of interstate trade competition (possible if there is an appropriate correlation between supply and demand) implies the leading role of international trade in meeting the needs of the population with essential goods, meaning by the latter “strategic” food products, which cannot be produced in sufficient quantities locally, and it is also impossible to imagine the satisfaction of the basic vital needs of the ancient Greeks without them – from food to cult-religious. Of the three main types of such commodities: olive oil, wine and bread, the latter was by far the most important⁶. Establishing the fact of the existence of international trade competition immediately increases the importance of ways to regulate trade to the level of a system of conscious state management of the economy of more developed countries. From this point of view, within the framework of this study, the hypothesis of the existence of trade competition between the Bosphorus and Egypt in the III century BC was subject to verification, which became one of the topical topics of historiography in 1928–1961. Having proved the existence of such competition, it will be possible to agree with the thesis of M.I. Rostovtsev that the ancient economy in the Hellenistic (and Roman-imperial) day differed from the modern one (it was said about the end of the XIX – the first half of the XX century) only quantitatively, not qualitatively. And this expands our understanding of the functions and arsenal of state regulatory measures in the field of economic production and exchange, and also in a certain way likens the functions of the then customs and tax services and the customs systems of modern countries. This similitude, associated with the exaggeration of the influence of trade on politics in ancient times, leads to the notion that trade routes inevitably coincide with political connections.

For the first time, the possibility of formulating a hypothesis about competition between the Bosphorus and Egypt in the grain trade in the vast Eastern Mediterranean was provided by M.I. Rostovtzeff in the article “Greek Sightseers in Egypt” (Rostovtzeff, 1928, 13–15), productive forces in Hellenistic agriculture, rejected the possibility of this assumption. Authorship of the hypothesis about the Egyptian-Bosporan competition in the grain trade of the III century BC, thus, belongs to S. A. Zhebelyev, who in the works “The Last Perisad and the Scythian uprising in the Bosphorus” (1933) and “The main lines of economic development of the Bosporan state” (1934) took the fact of this competition as the basis for his further reasoning on about the reasons for the progressive political and economic decline of the Bosphorus from III to I Century BC. This hypothesis was quickly picked up and replicated in historiography, although it was based on only a few lines of the so-called Zenon papyri, which refers to the measures of the assistant manager of the royal household, Ptolemy II Philadelphus, to provide transport for “ambassadors from Perisad and feors from Argos”, to observe the holiday in Arsinoe nome (Grakov, 1939, p. 261).

Without going into criticism of this entry, but considering in detail the argumentation of S. Zhebeliev’s hypothesis (mainly indirect evidence), the international political and economic situation in the then Eastern Mediterranean, and carefully analyzing the epigraphic and narrative sources of the history of the Hellenistic economy. in the article “From the history of the Hellenistic economy. On the issue of trade competition between the Bosphorus and Egypt in the III century BC” (1961) establishes several basic forms of providing the Aegean polisys – the main consumers of overseas exports – with bread. So, firstly, direct passion was quite a simple means of appropriating the right goods. For example, in the corpus of the works of Demosthenes (Dem., L, 6) and the pseudo-Aristotelian “Economics” (Ps.-Arist. Oecon., II, 1346b) it is reported about the forced unloading of Athenian ships with bread during the famine by the Byzantines, Calchedonians and in speeches The orator Lycurgus mentions the robbery of Athenian bread vessels on the way from Egypt to Piraeus (Trofimova, 1961, p. 59). In this regard, the standard norm-privilege of proxenic acts is filled with special meaning – “the right to enter and leave the harbor in time of war and peace without robbery and without a contract.”

Secondly, gifts played a significant role in replenishing grain resources. This practice, which was vividly attested in the 4th century, in the 3rd century. – during the rivalry of the Hellenistic monarchs, who paved the way for their political interests with such gifts, – spread significantly. An example here is the gifts of Cyrene to the Greek cities affected by the famine in the amount of about 805 thousand medimns (SEG, IX, 2); a gift of the king of the peons Avdoleont in 7,500 Macedonian medimns, delivered by him at his own expense to the harbor of Piraeus (Syll³, 371, 25–34); a gift of the Bosporan king Spartok in 15,000 medimns, made, like the previous one, in connection with the liberation of Athens from the power of Demetrius Poliorketes, which was certified by a decree of 289–288 BC (Syll³, 370, 23–24); a gift from Lysimachus to Athens of 10,000 Attic medimns of wheat (Syll³, 374, 7–12); дар (δῶρον) Hieron

⁶ The leitmotif of all the documents of the era was the fear of a grain famine, constant concern, which was caused by the problem of providing the population with bread.

of Syracuse to Ptolemy during the grain disaster in Egypt, certified by Athenaeus – a ship loaded, among other things, with 60,000 coppers of bread (Athen., V, 209b); huge in their amount gifts and customs privileges from rich polisys and powerful monarchs of Rhodes, who suffered from the terrible earthquake of 227 BC, as reported by Polybius (Polyb., V, 88, 89) and other examples.

Thirdly, not the last place among the forms of economic relations of a non-commercial nature was occupied by military indemnity and gifts (δῶρα), which were forcibly collected from the conquered population and often turned into a regular tribute – foros (Polyb., IV, 46). A vivid example of this is the mention in the Olbian decree in honor of Protagen of gifts paid to King Saitaferne and the “scepter-bearers” (IOSPE, I², 32).

Fourthly, a common form of regulation of the grain problem was such measures of the territorially large Hellenistic states as in-kind deliveries and the sale of grain by the government to areas that suffered from its shortage. For example, if the letter of Antigonos declared the delivery of grain to Lesbos polisys from directly taxed territories, then the Egyptian Tebtunis papyri of 201 (Teb., I, 8), on the contrary, reports the payment of foros in the form of bread by Lesbos and Thrace.

Fifthly, in many cases, trade forms of providing bread were characterized by elements of the same gifts, only not in a direct, but in a transformed form. We are talking about the repeated and varied only method of assistance provided to the state by citizens of this policy or foreigners (IG, II 2, № 903 = MIS, № 5; IOSPE, I², 32; Syll³, 493, 10–11; OGIS, 4, 21–23; SEG, I, fasc. II, 366, 40–45) in the purchase of bread (financial subsidies, the sale of grain at lower prices, etc.). The degree of voluntariness has always been different: from compulsory liturgies to completely free initiative, caused by the desire to become famous as an everget, to raise one’s own political weight, or to achieve purely business material benefits and privileges. (Trofimova, 1961, p. 59–62).

However, one should not underestimate the prevalence of trade methods of grain supply. In the classical and Hellenistic eras, the practice of concluding treaties and contracts between polisys (συνθήκαι καὶ συμβολαί) spread. So, during the 4th and some part of the 3rd century, there was a trade agreement between Athens and the Bosphorus (more precisely, the Bosphoran royal house of Spartocidae), which was confirmed with each change of ruler on the Bosphoran throne (Istoria Mutnoi spravy (in Ukrainian), 2006, p. 116–131). Aristotle mentions contracts and agreements as effective measures to ensure nutrition (τροφή) of the polis in his Rhetoric (Arist., Rhetor., A 4, 1359b, 19). Various polisies in the III century BC, despite the political situation and real threats due to the expansionist policy of the Hellenistic monarchs, still used the old way of grain supply for the Greek world – sithonia, expeditions for the purchase of bread. For example, there is information about the Athenian sithonia of the III century BC in Metapontus and Syracuse (SEG, III, 92), Athenian Sithonia 271–270 BC to an unknown place (SEG, XIV, 65), data have been preserved on three Samian sithonia mentioned in the decree in honor of Bulagor 246–245 BC (SEG, I, fasc. II, 366) τοιο (Trofimova, 1961, p. 64).

Any form of providing food (τροφή) to the population of the polis hid some problems and conflicts, however, the trading form was the most problematic, because it forced the weak administrative structures of the city to seek a balance between the exorbitant prices that private traders sought to impose and the prospect of leaving the city on a hungry. soldering. To solve this dichotomy in the conditions of permanent financial complications that arose due to a rather primitive budgetary organization, it was possible, as we have already said, thanks to the involvement of a voluntary or semi-voluntary initiative of citizens and foreigners. (Trofimova, 1961, p. 64). It cannot be said that no attempts were made to remove this contradiction. So, in a decree from Ios at the end of the III century BC, we are talking about Dionysiodorus, the son of Demophilus, who was elected agoran, who, so that “citizens had the opportunity to buy sufficient [quantity] of grain, persuaded other citizens to contribute in advance and contributed in advance himself without money” (IG, XII, 5, 1011, 3–4). Parallels to this method of solving the problem of nationwide grain purchases can be traced in other decrees (IG, XI, 4, 1049), including the Olbian decree in honor of Protogenes. (IOSPE, I², 32). In preparation for the Synoecism of Lebedos and Teos, by producing the status of a new polis, the representatives of the Lebedosites reach Antigonos’s consent to the creation of a permanent monetary fund for the needs of grain imports. “Representatives of the Lebedos people said that it was necessary to allocate 1,400 golden coins from the income for the grain supply, so that everyone who wishes, taking this gold as a pledge, imports grain into the city and sells it during the year, whenever he wants; when the year ended, he gave the gold to the city and the [amount] itself, and the interest at which it was taken” (Syll³, 344, 72–76). In the objections of Antigonos,

financial considerations are at the forefront: “We did not want to give any city [the right to independently] import grain, or create a grain reserve, without allowing cities to spend a lot of money on this, which is not necessary ...”, but “we establish it by making sure cities become debt-free” (Syll³, 344, 80–82; 87–88; Welles, 1934, p. 15 & next; Trofimova, 1961, p. 55). The hope to deprive the city of debts forces Antigonos to agree to the project of the citizens of Lebedus. A certain parallel to this project of creating a reserve fund, which guarantees the stability of trade and reduces risks, was the practice of selling bread on credit, which was characteristic of the Athenian-Bosporan trade operations in IV century BC (IG, II², № 212, 54–59 = MIS, № 3, c. 240; Dem., XX, 40). Consequently, the dependence of the grain supply of polisys on trade gave rise to the complex problem of financing this trade.

Against the background of the preservation of traditional forms of ensuring food needs in the Hellenistic era, as already noted, centralized methods of solving the grain problem for the population of cities that had nothing to do with the polis trade in bread, in which the interested city was free both in choosing its counterparty and under the terms of the contract. In fact, we are no longer talking about free trade, but about the supply of grain from the satraps regulated by the tsarist administration to the city. Hellenistic rulers readily agree to a wide resolution of regulated trade, since it was precisely from it that, through a duty, the incomes of the royal satraps could increase. Thus, with close attention and thoroughness, the procedure for the import and export of goods for the united Lesbos and Teos is determined (Syll³, 344, 94–101).

Another feature of the trade exchange of the era of classics and Hellenism was, according to N.K. Trofimova, the fact that “foreign trade relations left a kind of “canvas” on which politics created their essays, but these essays did not repeat the outline of the canvas: the political situation changed, trade relations remained unchanged for a long time” (Трофимова, 1961, с. 67). Thus, in numerous proxenic decrees addressed to merchants, covering the entire Mediterranean with a small network of foreign trade relations, it is difficult to find any political logic. Citizens of the same polis trade with regions subordinate to Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia, although these countries are at enmity with each other. The ties of the colony with the metropolis remained very persistent. Relations with grain-supplying centers turned out to be no less strong: for example, behind the Clazomenes, who, according to the Antalcidian peace, went to Persia, the Athenian decree of 387–386 BC confirmed the right to arrive in the harbors of those cities in which the Clazomenians supplied themselves with bread.

Results. Summing up the preliminary considerations, it should be emphasized that the free foreign trade in grain was by no means the only form of solving the problem of grain supply to the Greek policies. Gifts, spoils of war, tribute, the system of taxation and sale of grain in the territories subject to the Hellenistic kingdoms – all this indicates a significant influence of the political factor on the distribution of grain wealth. This means that agricultural products by no means always took the form of a commodity sold and bought on the market. Their wealth or deficiency was not directly determined by the amount of grain-product, in other words, by the offer in trade. Grain supply did not depend on the ratio of supply and demand; therefore, a permanent grain shortage was not necessarily associated with a shortage of bread or with supposedly low agricultural technology (the example of a technologically advanced and at the same time centralized “command-administrative” agricultural production in Egypt in the III century BC seems to be very significant). Consequently, for “international relations, where the methods of non-economic coercion manifested themselves with such force, the assumption that there could be trade competition between two states (Bosporus and Egypt), which took place in forms similar to modern ones (one of the states tends to decline as a result of defeat in the international market) seems unjustified” (Trofimova, 1961, p. 68).

On the one hand, the means of a non-economic, non-trade solution to the most acute food problem for ancient policies, discussed above, limit the scope of the functioning of free foreign trade. This, of course, narrows the sphere of influence of state-regulatory methods of managing foreign economic activity, if not turning them into marginal government measures. Consequently, these methods, even in conditions of their conscious and complex application, could not radically change the economic situation in the Mediterranean Region or contribute to changes in the economic situation of specific countries. However, on the other hand, these non-economic means of intervention of the Hellenistic states in the sphere of food (and not only) exchange can be considered as attempts to regulate trade by limiting the segment in which the mechanisms of the free market would function.

In conclusion, it should be noted that in the ancient world, of all forms of economic exchange, trade, although it did not occupy a marginal place, did not at all dominate over non-commercial forms of supply and exchange. Given that even the most important food products for the survival of the population,

primarily bread, mostly did not acquire (or, in other words, acquired in an insignificant part) the form of a commodity, there was no place for interstate economic competition, similar to the epochs of the New and Modern times, in the ancient Mediterranean Region has not been as a fact. From the time of the archaic through the period of the classics to the Hellenistic era, the change in the meaning of the role of trade as one of the forms of economic exchange can be metaphorically likened to a parabola. That is, from a marginal, auxiliary tool in the archaic era, when the ideal of polis autarky was systematically cultivated, trade became one of the most common ways to provide the most advanced policies with everything necessary that could not be worked out on the spot, in the classical era, and in the Hellenistic period – just one of the available effective methods of supplying the population with scarce products. In this regard, such methods of state regulation of trade activity as monetary and financial regulation, the establishment of a state monopoly on the sale (sometimes on production) of a certain group of goods, the legislative consolidation of specific points (mainly ports) for the implementation of purchase and sale operations, the simplification of the structure and the reduction in the number of customs payments, and finally, the donation of ateliers – the right to trade without duties (and freedom from various kinds of taxes), basically did not seek to stimulate their own production and promote the development of certain economic sectors, fight foreign competitors and support domestic producers. The main goal of the entire complex of these measures was to satisfy the interests of the state fiscal, that is, to guarantee the further enrichment of the treasury through trade duties, customs payments and other means.

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**РЕГУЛЮВАННЯ ЗОВНІШНЬОЕКОНОМІЧНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ
ДЕРЖАВАМИ ПІВНІЧНОГО ПРИЧОРНОМОР'Я В V–I СТ. ДО Н. Е.**

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Мета. Дана робота присвячена аналізу методів регулювання торгівлі в стародавніх державах Північного Причорномор'я в класичний, елліністичний та римський періоди, зокрема йдеться про привілей вільної торгівлі, або безмитності (ателія), торговельну монополію, фінансове регулювання тощо.

Методи. В цьому дослідженні виявлено теоретико-методологічні аспекти історичного процесу інтеграції еллінських держав Північного Причорномор'я в торговельні та митні відносини Понтійського басейну та Егейського регіону, а також в імперську митну систему Риму.

Результати. Запропоновано авторську концепцію ролі митного регулювання та інших способів регулювання зовнішньоекономічних відносин у давнину. Особливий акцент робиться на генезі історіографічних концепцій, що формуються навколо питань оподаткування та митних відносин у зв'язку з проблемами міжнародної торгівлі Тіри, Ольвії, Херсонесу, Боспору, Єгипту, міст-держав островів Егейського регіону в класичний та елліністичний періоди та римську епоху. У статті розглядаються можливості побудови задовільної моделі історії міжнародної торгівлі та митних відносин у Східно-Середземноморському регіоні в античні часи.

Висновки. У цій статті визначено роль міжнародних торговельних угод у забезпеченні зернової торгівлі Боспору з Афінами та Мітіленою (Лесбос) і ймовірною торговельною конкуренцією Боспору та Єгипту. У цій статті розглядаються можливості побудови задовільної моделі історії міжнародної торгівлі та митних відносин в Егейському регіоні та всьому Східному Середземномор'ї в класичний, елліністичний та римський періоди.

Ключові слова: стародавня економічна історія, античне господарство, еллінські держави Північного Причорномор'я – Тіра, Ольвія, Херсонес, Боспор, методи регулювання міжнародної торгівлі, торговельна політика, митна політика, митне регулювання, митні та податкові відносини, ателія (безмитність), псефісма, проксенія, неторговельні форми обміну.